The Global Age: Europe 1950–2017 by Ian Kershaw

Book Review: Ian Kershaw’s The Global Age: Europe 1950–2017 is the second book of his sweeping history of twentieth-century Europe (preceded by To Hell and Back: Europe 1914-1949). Kershaw is one of the preeminent historians of modern Europe, best known for writing a highly regarded biography of Hitler. His two-volume history of Europe takes a much wider lens. What results is an outstanding survey of twentieth-century Europe, a work that is primarily political and economic history but not without some cultural touches. He has a remarkable ability to zoom in on key issues within individual countries and then draw out the larger European and international parallels, linkages, and contrasts. The result is a coherent narrative of a fragmented century. I recommend The Global Age to anyone with an interest in the Cold War or the complicated story of post-war European history.

The Cold War and its consequences provide the book with its central axis. The devastation of World War II was met with the shadow of ideological conflict and the prospect of future war. This had a disproportionate impact on the countries that would form the Soviet bloc (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania) as well as Albania and Yugoslavia, which succumbed to communist authoritarianism. Kershaw shows how the authoritarian wreckage of the interwar years in these countries was compounded by four decades of Soviet domination, leaving them far poorer than the rest of Europe as well as lacking effective and orderly governance under the rule of law. It is astounding that so much of Europe was in a kind of suspended animation for seventy years, essentially trapped in backward authoritarian political systems.

In contrast, while Western Europe liberalized and developed economically it also remained on a war footing. This brought about periods of contentious internal politics as well as military interventions aimed at preserving overseas possessions, lest they fall to communism (Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya, Kenya). Nevertheless, Western Europe advanced by developing and integrating its economies in the shadow of the Cold War. More broadly, liberal and moderate conservative parties (e.g. Christian Democratic parties in West Germany and Italy; Gaullists in France) played a stabilizing role, tamping down radical politics while building social safety nets and committing to international cooperation—avoiding the worst mistakes of the interwar period. The most critical aspect of this was the Franco-German relationship. The Coal and Steel Community, which began as a limited zone of economic cooperation, became the germ of what would eventually be the European Union. These steps mattered, not only as symbols of reconciliation but as mechanisms that tied the fates of the two old adversaries together. Kershaw rightly emphasizes how crucial it was that two moderate conservatives—Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer—managed to steer their countries through the perilous years of the late 1950s and 1960s. Kershaw’s book demonstrates how Western Europeans learned the lessons of the twentieth century, building multilateral institutions, tempering nationalistic politics, and eliminating economic barriers.  

None of this would have been possible without the United States. The Soviet Union certainly bore the brunt of destroying Nazi Germany, but it was U.S. aid and military power that proved decisive. To the credit of post-war U.S. leadership starting with President Truman, the decision to remain deeply involved in Europe after the war brought about peace and prosperity for millions of Europeans. The Marshall Plan and NATO were two tentpoles that held up Western Europe in the crucial years after 1945. NATO imposed order by directing Western European defense eastward, rather than at one another. Moreover, the Marshall Plan’s dollars also had a catalytic political effect. The distribution of aid had the beneficial effect of greater coordination among Western European states, leading directly to the creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (the forerunner of the OECD) and, alongside it, the Council of Europe in 1949, which produced the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950—a foundational framework in international law. We take it for granted that there was no major war in Europe until the 1990s, but that accomplishment rested on the Atlantic alliance, the Marshall Plan, and the American-led liberal international order.

The Eastern Bloc, by contrast, was an unstable and exploitative system. Despite its ideological facade, the Soviet Union was a colonial power, extracting resources and demanding political obedience from the countries in its orbit—those occupied by the Red Army after 1945. Re-industrialization in the USSR and its satellites delivered short-term growth, but the structural flaws of central planning and socialist economics—inefficiency, corruption, lack of innovation—were ultimately unsustainable. What appeared to be stability was in fact stagnation, and the system’s weaknesses became more apparent with each passing decade.

Kershaw also reminds us that history is highly contingent. While historians have moved away from “Great Man” narratives, there is no denying that without Mikhail Gorbachev there would not have been a peaceful end to the Cold War. Crucially, Gorbachev recognized the deep structural problems within the USSR and its satellites, and his reforms were an attempt to adapt and save the system. His policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) loosened the Soviet system from within, while his decision to renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine—the policy of military intervention to enforce communist orthodoxy, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968—allowed the Eastern European satellites to chart their own course. By the late 1980s, however, it was too late for the Soviet state: the peoples of the satellite countries saw that their future lay not in socialism but in Western Europe’s liberal democratic capitalism. These choices made possible the wave of largely nonviolent revolutions in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, the Soviet republics—those not outright seized by the USSR like the Baltic countries—were holdovers from the Russian Empire—“a people’s prison”—long overdue for collapse and the establishment of political self-determination.

The end of the Cold War was, for the most part, remarkably peaceful. Outside of Romania’s bloody transition and the turmoil within Russia itself, communist governments collapsed with relatively little violence. Yugoslavia was ultimately the tragic exception, though the violence would occur in the years 1991 through 1999. While ethnic and national differences drove these conflicts, not enough was said about the failure of the communist system that created Yugoslavia’s dangerous climate in the first place. By the end of Tito’s rule, living standards had collapsed, economic imbalances between regions such as Slovenia and Kosovo widened, and the country was crippled by high debt, inflation, and unemployment. The economic decline of the 1980s destabilized the political order and created a fertile environment for violence. The Yugoslav Wars—the Slovenian War of Independence (1991), the Croatian War of Independence (1991–1995), the Bosnian War (1992–1995), and the Kosovo War (1998–1999)—were, at least in part, another legacy of communism.

In the 1990s, Western European politics also shifted in response to the Cold War’s end. Some of these changes were for the better: German reunification set the stage for the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union and laid the groundwork for the currency union, accelerating the project of European integration. At the same time, the sudden collapse of the Cold War order proved disruptive. Italy offers the starkest example, where both the major post-war blocs—the Christian Democrats on the center-right and the Socialists on the left—collapsed in the wake of corruption scandals and the changing political landscape, giving rise to entirely new parties and political alignments.

Kershaw was also clear-eyed about threats from Russia. Long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he identified Putin’s annexation of Crimea and infiltration of the Donbas region as signs of an increasingly aggressive, irredentist Russia intent on destabilizing the post-war liberal international order.

The end of the Cold War should have been the opportunity to renew international governance, rebuild the UN, and set up stronger trade and legal institutions. Instead, both the United States and Europe squandered it. The U.S. stumbled badly after 9/11 and forfeited much of its international leadership in the misguided “War on Terror” followed by blundering into the 2008 Financial Crisis. Meanwhile, the European Union proved itself to be an incomplete project—an economic union without sufficient political governance. Weak economic growth and the divisive politics of immigration and terrorism created a mood of disillusionment among Europeans. Brexit and the rise of right-wing populist parties indicate Europe is becoming increasingly ungovernable, evoking the 1930s. 

Kershaw’s narrative is, in the end, a sobering one. Europe emerged from the devastation of World War II with unprecedented stability and prosperity, yet squandered opportunities and new challenges have left it vulnerable again. The book reminds us of both the successes and the failures of the post-war era, and how much of what we take for granted—the absence of war, the wealth created by the post-war liberal international order—depends on institutions, laws, and treaties that are all too fragile and can easily erode.

Ian Kershaw, The Global Age: Europe 1950–2017 (New York: Viking, 2018).