The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict by William T. Cavanaugh

Book Review: William T. Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict is an ambitious book. Cavanaugh offers critical, and at times biting, perspectives on how Western intellectuals have analyzed religious violence. The book is entirely historiographic analysis where Cavanaugh confronts selected, representative scholarship from experts in the subject of religious violence–by no means all historians, as he includes other intellectuals and journalists (e.g., Christopher Hitchens and Andrew Sullivan). Cavanaugh contends that religious violence is largely a myth because the entire concept is based upon abstracting religion out of complex cultural circumstances and then isolating the cause of violence to religious motives while ignoring all of the other potential triggers for war and violence.

Book cover of The Myth of Religious Violence by William T. Cavanaugh

Moreover, Cavanaugh argues this myth serves Western liberal democracy by touting its virtues of free thought, liberty, and freedom to worship. The dark underside of the myth is the West’s power to set international norms that provide permission structures that, ironically, are justify secular violence against non-Western Others. “The myth of religious violence tries to establish as timeless, universal, and natural a very contingent set of categories—religious and secular—that are in fact constructions of the modern West. Those who do not accept these categories as timeless, universal, and natural are subject to coercion.”[1] Written in 2009, readers familiar with the decade will recognize Cavanaugh was living through the end of the Bush Administration and its misguided War on Terror that brought about disastrous regime changes and state building projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Cavanaugh’s frequent references to contemporary events reveals he was reacting to these events in the height of the backlash against the War on Terror. 

Cavanaugh structures his argument in four chapters. He begins by confronting the idea that religion and violence are linked due to the integral facets of organized faith. Examining nine prominent intellectuals (including Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence), Cavanaugh points to the various flaws in their arguments. For the most part, he dismisses each work for not offering a clear enough definition of the term “religion” (i.e., either just ignoring it, or offering an overly broad definition that it can be conflated with various political ideologies) or pointing to the author’s inability to clearly separate religious violence from secular violence. In the following chapter, Cavanaugh makes the argument that religion cannot be separated from culture, nor do religions ever remain constant in history (i.e., 11th century Hinduism is different from 15th century Hinduism). The idea of a transhistorical or transcultural “religion” belies the actual history of religion, which is context-dependent and “depends on different configurations of power and authority.” Furthermore, Cavanaugh takes a further step to claim that transhistorical or transcultural concepts of religion only serve power structures established by (and protective of) the Western liberal democratic nation-state that wishes to relegate religion to the realm of the private, a matter of individual discretion. Having set-up and defended his principal arguments, Cavanaugh’s next two chapters put his thesis in action, first confronting the “wars of religion” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe which he refers to as “the creation myth for the modern state.” He argues the Western liberal democratic nation-states developed a self-serving myth that religious wars could only be prevented via a strong central government (with religion being replaced by nationalism as a new faith). Finally, Cavanaugh explores the political uses of the “myth of religious violence” in chapter 4 where he argues that the Western view of organized religion allows a permission structure to inflict violence on religious actors, viz. Muslims in the War on Terror.

Stylistically, The Myth of Religious Violence often reads like Cavanaugh is finally getting to vent long-held intellectual frustrations. Nevertheless, the book’s first two chapters make an important intervention in the historiography of religious violence: essentializing “religious violence” across cultures and histories seems unnecessary given the risk of dismissing historical determinants—especially idiosyncratic factors. Cavanaugh is especially good at citing the works of other scholars who have called into question the classification of non-Abrahamic faiths like Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism as “religions.” More importantly, he is persuasive regarding the potential problems with transhistorical or transcultural concepts of religion. This argument echoes Ussama Makdisi’s point of view made in the AHR discourse on religious violence in 2007: 

The relationship between religious violence and religious identity is…a complex one, and I am not willing to generalize across cultures and time…On some questions there is indeed merit in generalizing, but not on this one concerning religious violence, at least not beyond a regional perspective…I think we tend to agree that there is no such thing as “purely” religious violence, but if I understood the question correctly, the problem arises when trying to infer larger meaning from specific moments of religious violence.[2]

Clearly religion and violence occur as a phenomenon, and phenomena can occur at scale. In chapter three Cavanaugh conflates multifactorial causes of religious war in order to dismiss studying phenomena of religious violence. Indeed, his attempt to dissect the sixteenth and seventeenth century European wars of religion was too ambitious, and the various complicating factors he finds in the histories of these wars does not differ from what historians like Natalie Zemon Davis, Mark Holt, and Barbara Diefendorf have readily acknowledged: economic, social, and political factors are also at play and may exacerbate religious rivalries (and vice versa). Moreover, Cavanaugh makes the leap to state formation as the real underlying driver of violence; while this may or may not be a defensible argument, clearly the role of the state doesn’t explain all of the historical acts of religious violence. Nor does it explain away the violence of more recent internecine conflicts stemming from religious conflicts (the Partition of India, the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Bosnian War, Lebanese Civil War). Finally, the “uses of the myth” explored in chapter four felt like an unneeded appendix, especially the unnecessary recitation on U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence (the author is not an historian nor a lawyer, much less a constitutional law expert). Finally, reflecting the political discourse of the late ‘00s, Cavanaugh stakes clear ideological positions that only perpetuate myths he prefers to believe in.


[1] Cavanaugh, William T. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 6.

[2] “AHR Conversation: Religious Identities and Violence.” American Historical Review 112 (December 2007): 1433-1481.


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For more writing on religion, violence, and ideology, see Religion, Violence, and Ideology.